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Abstract
We exploit the implementation of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme to identify exogenous shifts in mothers’ labor force participation and its
impact on their children’s educational outcomes. Using child level panel data, we
find that a mother’s participation in the labor force increases her children’s time
spent in school and leads to better grade progression. These results account for age
cohort trends and for differences in time trends by initial levels of economic
development at the district and sub-district levels. We find evidence of greater
household decision-making power of working mothers as an explanation of our
results.
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1 Introduction
The World Development Report (World Bank 2012), focusing on gender equality,
highlights the economic disadvantages faced by women in the poorer regions of the
world. Although significant progress has been made in reducing gender disparities in
health and educational outcomes, economic opportunities remain limited for women.
In particular, existing research suggests that variation in women’s labor force participa-
tion is associated with changes in individual and household behavior on several fronts
including marriage (viz., van der Klaauw 1996), fertility (viz., Goldin and Katz 2002),
and intra-household resource allocation (viz., Luke and Munshi 2011). Thus, the policy
priority of closing the gender differences in access to economic opportunities is critical
not only for reducing poverty but also for improving individual and household welfare
in developing countries.
In this paper, we exploit the exogenous, temporal sub-district level variation in the
intensity of implementation of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(NREGS) to identify shifts in rural women’s participation in the labor market and its
impact on their children’s educational outcomes. The scheme operationalized the
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2005) by providing a legal guarantee for
up to 100 days of annual employment at a predetermined wage rate to rural
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households willing to supply manual labor on local public works.1 From a gender
perspective, there are two interesting features of this program. First, the wage rate of-
fered in the scheme is uniform across gender, and second, it gives priority to female
employment on public works and mandates one third of the program beneficiaries to
be women. Thus, NREGS not only brings employment opportunities to rural women’s
doorstep but the equal wage rates provided in the program can also reduce any gender
disparity prevalent in the rural labor markets.
A change in parental labor supply could affect children’s educational outcomes purely
due to an income effect. However, labor force participation of mothers, per se, could
impact her children’s education through additional channels. First, mothers are likely to
have more alternative uses of their time than fathers—market work, household chores,
and leisure. If children’s time in doing household chores substitutes for mother’s time,
then an increase in labor force participation of mothers may lead to a decline in the
educational attainment of her children. However, if the mother’s and children’s time are
not close substitutes and child care services in the market are either unavailable or
unaffordable, then it is possible that schools substitute for child care services and
children attend school when mothers are at work. Note, however, that this mechanism
is unlikely to hold if child care services are available within the household through the
presence of older members (viz., grandparents).
Second, a working mother’s say in household resource allocation decisions may be
greater due to her higher earned income. Existing research suggests that this is likely to
have a positive effect on her children’s schooling. If an increase in mother’s earned
income translates into greater weight being attached to her preferences in resource
allocation decisions of the household and mothers prefer to invest more in their
children’s health and education relative to fathers (Blumberg 1988; Thomas 1990;
Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003), then we should see an
improvement in child outcomes.
In this paper, we focus on the latter two channels of impact of mother’s labor supply
decisions on her children’s education. We, therefore, control for changes in household
level income to account for any income effect. The net impact of mother’s participation
in the labor force on her children’s time allocation and, thereby, schooling, would then
depend on which of the two effects dominate—the negative substitution effect or the
positive bargaining power effect.2
There exists relatively little empirical research on the impact of parental labor supply
on children’s time allocation, particularly in a developing country context. Skoufias
(1993) shows that an increase in female wages (and thereby female labor supply) in
rural India reduces the time in school significantly but only for girls. Similar results are
found by Grootaert and Patrinos (1999) in a cross-country study. However, Ilahi (1999)
does not find any impact of female wages on children’s time use in Peru.
In contrast to the sparse literature on time allocation effects, there is considerable
empirical evidence suggesting that households’ resource allocation decisions are made
in a “collective” or a bargaining framework where the final allocation usually depends
on the bargaining power or weights attached to the preferences of the members of the
household. The importance of labor income as a determinant of women’s bargaining
power within the household has been highlighted by Anderson and Eswaran (2009).
Using data from Bangladesh, the authors show that the effect of earned income on
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female autonomy is far greater than that of unearned income. Women who work on
the household farm have no more autonomy than those who are housewives, while
those who earn independent income have considerably greater autonomy. Luke and
Munshi (2011) exploit data from tea plantations in South India where women are
employed in permanent wage labor to find that a relative increase in female income
has a positive effect on their children’s education. Qian (2008) shows that a change in
agricultural pricing policy in post-Mao China, which increased female labor income,
raised the educational attainment of all children within the household. However, when
the policy increased male labor income, educational attainment of girls decreased but
had no effect on boys’ attainment.
We utilize child and household level panel data for 2007 and 2009–2010 from the
Young Lives Study in the state of Andhra Pradesh to assess the effect of mother’s
participation in the labor force on three educational outcomes of her children—time
spent in school, enrolment, and grade attainment. To identify exogenous shifts in
mothers’ labor force participation, we take advantage of the temporal, sub-district level
variation in the implementation of the NREGS. Our identification strategy utilizes the
lagged amount of funds allocated for the implementation of the NREGS as well as
lagged rainfall shocks within sub-districts as exogenous shifters of labor force participation
of women in rural areas. The analysis accounts for unobservable child characteristics, age
cohort trends, and differences in time trends by initial levels of economic development,
both at the district both the sub-district level.
Our results suggest that participation of mothers in the workforce results in more
time spent in school by their children. Almost half of the rise in children’s time in
school can be accounted by an increase in the probability of a child being enrolled in
school when the mother works. Further, this increase in school participation is reflected
in higher grade attainment of children. Labor force participation by the mother reduces
the gap between the child’s actual and ideal grade by more than 40 percentage points.
Our results are robust to the inclusion of a host of other variables that account for al-
ternative explanations for the improved educational attainment of children: changes in
fathers’ labor force participation, creation of household assets, migration, impact on
private wages, and increased supply or demand for public schools arising from NREGS
beneficiaries’ heightened awareness of their entitlements.
In order to understand the mechanisms through which these effects occur, we exploit
household level data on education expenditures and on household members’ say in
decision-making and control over income from various sources. The analysis of panel
data on household level expenditures shows that mother’s participation in the work-
force significantly increased the share of education in total household expenditure of
less landed households. Moreover, cross-sectional two-stage least squares (2SLS) ana-
lysis suggests that the probability that mothers have a say or control over utilization of
household earnings from different sources increases when they participate in the labor
force.
These results suggest that greater weightage on working mothers’ preferences in
household decision-making could be among the primary drivers of the improvements
in educational attainment of their children. While we cannot completely rule out the
possibility that schools serve as child care centers while mothers work, this mechanism
cannot account for all of our results: the impact of mother’s labor force participation
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on children’s time spent in school is robust to the presence of older members or
potential child care givers in the household and is equally significant for older children
who are relatively less likely to require child care services than the young. Our findings
can, hence, be explained within the framework of a bargaining model of household
resource allocation.
This study not only informs us about the relevance of women’s labor supply to intra-
household outcomes but it also addresses the broader policy issue of the role of the
design of public programs in improving household outcomes in developing countries.
Specifically, our paper extends the debate on the effect of workfare programs on house-
hold and individual welfare (Jalan and Ravallion 2003; Azam 2012; Dasgupta 2013;
Zimmermann 2014; Klonner and Oldiges 2014; Imbert and Papp 2015) and finds evi-
dence which suggests that mandating women’s participation in public programs has
consequences beyond those immediately intended by policy makers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
the methodology used in this paper. Section 3 discusses the results and Section 4
concludes.
2 Data and methodology
Our study is focused on Andhra Pradesh (AP)—India’s fifth largest state in terms of
population. We utilize data from the Young Lives Study (YLS)—a child and household
level panel from six districts of AP. To date, there have been three rounds of YLS sur-
veys. We conduct our empirical analysis at the level of the child using the two compar-
able waves of the YLS surveys—2007 and 2009–2010.3
The sample is restricted to children who were 5 to 14 years old, the school-going age
group, in 2007. In order to construct our data set, we use the following exclusion rules:
first, we only include households living in rural areas in both periods. Thus, children in
households which moved from rural to urban areas between the two rounds (less than
1 % of our sample) were dropped. Of the remaining sample, 2.8 % of the children in
2007 were not present in the subsequent round and were, therefore, dropped. Attrition
is, therefore, negligible in the sample. Finally, we exclude children for whom there is
some missing information on relevant covariates in either of the years. Our data set,
after these exclusions, contains information on 3275 children for both years.
Table 1 describes the summary statistics for 2007 and 2009–2010. The time spent in
school by children in the reference period (a typical day in the last week) went up from
5.78 h in 2007 to almost 7 h in 2009–2010. This increase is not driven by the changing
age composition of children over the 2 years—a comparison of children by age cohorts
shows that the time spent in school is significantly higher in 2009–2010 relative to
2007 (Fig. 1), reflective of more regular school attendance. Children in the survey, who
reported attending school regularly, spent almost 2 h more in school than those who
reported going to school irregularly, on a typical day. We can, therefore, interpret
greater time spent in school by a child as an indicator of greater number of days of
school attendance. The rise in time spent in school was accompanied by a rise in the
highest grade completed as well as the average grade progression during this period. 4
Enrolment rates also rose by 8 percentage points, largely a result of several 5-year-olds
joining school by 2009–2010.
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During the same period, there was a substantial rise in the proportion of children
whose mothers were part of the labor force, i.e., self-employed (farm or non-farm),
wage employed (farm or non-farm), or in salaried employment. Mothers’ labor force
participation rate increased from 69 % in 2007 to 88 % in 2009–2010 as shown in
Table 1. This was accompanied by a 34 percentage point increase in the proportion of
children whose mothers were participating in projects under the NREGS. A significant
part of the rise in mothers’ NREGS participation is due to the phasing of the program.
To elaborate, the NREGS was first rolled out in 2006 in the 200 “poorest” districts of
Table 1 Summary statistics
2007 2009–2010
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Child characteristics
Sex (female = 1, male = 0) 3275 0.51 0.50 3275 0.51 0.50
Age (years) 3275 8.35 3.01 3275 11.35 3.01
Enrolment 3275 0.79 0.41 3275 0.87 0.34
Time spent in school 3275 5.78 2.20 3275 6.93 2.64
Highest grade completed 2109 3.90 2.32 2109 6.27 2.57
Grade progression 2109 0.76 0.33 2109 0.78 0.22
Mother’s characteristics
Mother’s age (years) 3275 30.56 5.64 3275 33.52 5.59
Mother’s education (highest grade completed) 3270 1.86 3.28 3270 1.86 3.28
Whether mother is working 3275 0.69 0.46 3275 0.88 0.32
Whether mother has worked in NREGS 3272 0.28 0.45 3228 0.62 0.49
Father’s characteristics
Father’s age (years) 3127 36.34 6.36 3101 39.26 6.29
Father’s education (highest grade completed) 3126 3.91 4.51 3126 3.91 4.51
Whether father is working 3121 0.99 0.10 3095 0.98 0.14
Whether father has worked in NREGS 3121 0.25 0.43 3073 0.48 0.50
Household characteristics
Annual non-agricultural income (Rs.) 3275 28349 30452 3275 41404 46015
Annual agricultural income (Rs.) 3275 4100 21489 3275 8258 38656
Total income (Rs.) 3275 32449 36312 3275 49662 58843
Household size 3275 5.70 2.10 3275 5.71 2.19
Number of males in the age group 16–60 3275 1.31 0.81 3275 1.40 0.85
Average age of household members 3275 22.14 5.72 3275 24.56 5.62
Land owned by household (acres) 3275 2.11 3.21 3275 3.38 38.59
Asset index 3275 −0.60 1.49 3275 0.55 1.81
Region characteristics
Mandal level total night lights in 2006 3275 860.49 335.78 3275 860.49 335.78
Baseline enrolment rate in the district (2004–2005) 3275 0.92 0.07 3275 0.92 0.07
Instruments
Lagged rainfall shock 3275 1.71 0.78 3275 −0.02 0.65
Lagged amount of sanctioned NREGS funds in crores (Rs.) 3275 8.53 7.80 3275 10.59 5.56
Source: Young Lives data for all variables except Mandal level total night lights in 2006 (NOAA website), Baseline enrolment
rate in the district (National Sample Survey 2004–2005), Lagged rainfall shock (Center for Climatic Research, University of
Delaware), and Lagged amount of sanctioned NREGS funds (Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh)
Note: 1 crore = 10 million
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India (February 2006). Thereafter, it was extended to 130 additional districts in May
2007 and to all districts in the country by 1 April 2008. Our study period coincides
with the initial implementation of the NREGS (four YLS districts in phase 1), followed
by nationwide coverage by 2008 (an additional YLS district each in phases 2 and 3).5
Given that the increase in mothers’ overall work participation rate was accompanied by
an increase in their participation in the NREGS, it suggests a potential impact of the
scheme on mothers’ labor force participation. We discuss this in detail later in our
identification strategy.
The rise in mothers’ labor force participation correlates positively with the change in
time spent in school by their children, as shown in Fig. 2. When we classify mothers
into those who worked in 2007 but dropped out of the labor force in 2009–2010, those
who did not change their workforce participation status between 2007 and 2009–2010
and those who did not work in 2007 but entered the labor force in 2009–2010, we find
that while the change in children’s time spent in school is positive for all three categor-
ies, it has been largest for the last group. In contrast to the rising labor force participa-
tion of mothers, fathers’ participation in paid labor (approximately 98 %) was largely
unchanged during this period. 6 The real, average annual household income (in 2009
rupees) also increased during this period, primarily due to a rise in non-agricultural
income.
2.1 Methodology
We estimate the following specification:
TSSchmdt ¼ αchmd þ φ1MOTHERWORKchmdt þ φ2INChmdt
þ δ0 Zhmdt þ δ1Xchmd  t þ δ2Vhmd  t
þδ3DEVmd  t þ δ4DEVDISTd  t þ εchmdt
TSSchmdt is the time spent in school by child c in household h in a sub-district or
mandal m in district d at time t. 7 MOTHER_WORKchmdt is a dummy variable that
Fig. 1 Time spent (hours) in school by child’s age cohort
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takes the value 1 if the mother participates in the labor market and 0 otherwise.
INChmdt is the total annual household income from all sources. It includes parental
income from participation in any paid work, including the NREGS. 8 Since time alloca-
tion decisions are a function of household demographics, we include the number and
the average age of household members in Zhmdt. Schooling decisions depend on the
age and gender of the child. For instance, older children are more likely to spend time
working for wages or taking care of their siblings. We allow for this effect to be non-
linear in age by including dummy variables for each age cohort (5 to 14 years) in 2007.9
We also address any time trends in girls’ education by including a dummy for female
child. Since both these variables—the age of the child in 2007 and gender—are time in-
variant, they are included in Xchmd and interacted with the time trend t, which takes
the value 0 for the year 2007 and 1 for the period 2009–2010. Vhmd is a vector of
households’ wealth—asset and land ownership in 2007—interacted with t to allow for
trends in the households’ economic status affecting investments in child’s education.10
We allow regions with different initial levels of economic development to have differ-
ent trends: first, we include the total night lights in 2006 in a mandal, DEVmd, and
interact it with t.11 Second, districts where the NREGS was implemented earlier (phase
1) were less developed than districts where the program was implemented later (phases
2 and 3). We include a dummy which equals 1 if the child belongs to a phase 1 district,
otherwise 0, in DEV_DISTd.
12 In addition, to account for differences in the initial level
of school participation, we also include the average primary school enrolment rate (for
children aged 5–10 years) at the district level, in 2004–2005 in DEV_DISTd.
13 This
vector is then interacted with t.
Given this specification, and using data on a balanced panel of children over the two
time periods, we estimate a child fixed effects model. In doing so, we eliminate αchmd
or any unobservable, time invariant child characteristics.14 If we assume that the
deviations of the observed variables from their mean values are not correlated with the
Fig. 2 Change in child’s time spent in school by change in mother’s labor force participation
status (2007–2009–2010)
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deviation of the error term from its mean, this specification yields a consistent estimate
of our main coefficient of interest, φ1.
The main concern with our estimation strategy is that household income and
mothers’ labor supply decisions are likely to be determined simultaneously with in-
vestments in children’s education. To address this simultaneity issue, we adopt a
2SLS estimation procedure using temporal variation in rainfall shocks in the previ-
ous agriculture year and allocation of funds to the NREGS program at the begin-
ning of a financial year, both at the mandal level, as instruments. We describe our
instruments and discuss their validity next.
2.2 Validity of instruments
Using the YLS data, we find that the crop which the largest proportion of rural house-
holds cultivate (almost 36 % across rounds 2 and 3) is rice. The cultivation of rice is
highly water-intensive. Rice seedlings are grown in nurseries which are then manually
transplanted into the flooded fields. It is therefore expected that rainfall will promote
the development of rice seedlings enabling farmers to increase their cultivation of rice
which in turn could raise agricultural incomes. Furthermore, studies suggest that rural
women’s labor force participation in India may be higher when households face adverse
shocks. Women, for instance, could be expected to contribute to household income
when agricultural employment opportunities and earnings are lower for men during a
drought (Himanshu 2011). Weather shocks could, therefore, carry implications for
women’s labor force participation as well. Hence, we use mandal level rainfall shock as
one of the instruments.
We define rainfall shock as the deviation of actual rainfall from the long-term average
rainfall, divided by the long-term standard deviation, at the mandal level.15 Corresponding
to the reference period for agricultural income in each YLS survey round, we calculate
rainfall shocks during June 2005 to May 2006 (for the 2007 YLS round) and during June
2008 to May 2009 (for the 2009–2010 YLS round). Note that the reference period for
children’s time spent in school is the previous week—January to July 2007 for the 2007
round of the YLS and August 2009 to March 2010 for the 2009–2010 round. Thus, rainfall
shock is lagged with respect to children’s educational outcomes (hence, we refer to it as
“lagged rainfall shock” from now). This obviates any direct effect of contemporaneous
rainfall shocks on children’s time in school.
However, if rainfall shocks affect children’s health outcomes contemporaneously and
the latter persist into subsequent years, then previous rainfall shocks could directly
impact current schooling outcomes. We use data on school attendance in the last
12 months for a subset of “indexed” children to investigate this link.16 We find that,
conditional on being enrolled, approximately 11 % of these children reported missing
school due to illness or injury in each round. To check whether missing school due to
current morbidity is correlated with past rainfall shocks, we run a pooled ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression of a dummy variable for whether a child missed school due to
an illness on lagged rainfall shock (results are available on request). The coefficient on
lagged rainfall shock is insignificant. This provides suggestive evidence that, in our
sample, past rainfall shock is unlikely to directly impact children’s current time in
school but should affect it via the impact on past household income.
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Our second instrument is lagged NREGS funds sanctioned at the beginning of each
financial year (April) for a mandal in 2009 rupees.17 Note that the NREGS is envisaged
as a demand-driven program: households are expected to apply for work to the village
council (or gram panchayat, GP) and once a critical mass of demand is generated in a
GP (a collection of one to three villages) in a mandal, a project has to be selected from
the approved list of works and sanctioned by the district administration.18 Thus, to
avoid any reverse causality, i.e., current NREGS funds being determined by current
demand for work, we use lagged sanctioned NREGS funds as an instrument. This is
preferred to using actual expenditure on NREGS which is more likely to be driven by
the demand for the program. Since the NREGS was initiated only in 2006–2007, we
use the 2006–2007 financial year sanctioned program funds as an instrument for the
2007 YLS round.19 For the 2009–2010 survey, we take a 1-year lag with respect to the
households’ reference period for work activities and use the sanctioned funds in the
financial year 2007–2008 as the instrument.20
Our identification strategy, thus, uses the change in sanctioned program funds within
mandals irrespective of the NREGS phase the district belongs to. But what determines
differential changes in NREGS fund allocation? A plausible explanation is that sanc-
tioned program funds change to reflect demand that varies by the level of economic de-
velopment of the mandal. However, we have already controlled for trends by baseline
economic prosperity (i.e., DEVmd*t and DEV_DISTd*t) in our specification. Another
possible determinant of systematic changes in funds sanctioned at the mandal level
could be electoral exigencies during the 2009 state elections in AP. However, Sheahan
et al. (2014) do not find any evidence of vote buying through NREGS expenditures be-
fore the 2009 legislative council elections at the constituency level (which roughly
correspond to mandals). Thus, controlling for the above trends, the residual variation
in changes in NREGS fund allocation (which we use in our identification strategy) is
likely to be quasi-random.21
A concern that remains is temporal learning by the local administration. To elabor-
ate, say, that the administration is learning how to implement NREGS, which improves
between 2006 and 2009 along with the quantum of sanctioned funds, this learning
spills over to the provision of the public good of interest to us—education. In this case,
our IV will not meet the exclusion restriction as it would have a direct effect on educa-
tional outcomes. However, in Andhra Pradesh, school participation is near universal.22
According to the Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER 2006), the percentage of
out of school rural children in the 6–14 age group was from 0 to 5 % in all the YLS dis-
tricts except West Godavari where it was between 5 to 10 % in 2006. Further, the Right
to Education (RTE) Act of India, which guarantees schooling for 6–14-year-olds, came
into effect in April 2010, after our study period. Thus, any administrative “learning”
with respect to public schooling would be minimal, if at all. Second, while it is quite
likely that administrative capacity and NREGS implementation improved over time, it
is unlikely that this was accompanied by administrative improvements in public
schooling. The administrative machinery that has been created for the NREGS
implementation at the grassroots level and which helps expand capacity for the
program is different and delinked from that required for public schooling. Third,
elections to village councils for a 5-year term were held in 2006. Since there were no
changes in local governments during the period of our study, there are unlikely to have
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Table 2 Effect of mother’s work status on child’s time spent in school
Variable Time spent in school
OLS-FE 2SLS-FE
(1) (2)
Mother is working 0.293*** 6.506***
(0.101) (1.102)
Annual household income in thousands (Rs.) 0.001 0.013
(0.001) (0.013)
Age 5 in 2007 × time 8.768*** 14.127***
(0.695) (1.275)
Age 6 in 2007 × time 8.674*** 13.948***
(0.702) (1.280)
Age 7 in 2007 × time 8.114*** 13.310***
(0.699) (1.264)
Age 8 in 2007 × time 8.030*** 13.542***
(0.719) (1.336)
Age 9 in 2007 × time 7.700*** 12.987***
(0.708) (1.265)
Age 10 in 2007 × time 7.743*** 13.218***
(0.696) (1.297)
Age 11 in 2007 × time 7.233*** 12.542***
(0.714) (1.301)
Age 12 in 2007 × time 7.220*** 12.827***
(0.683) (1.303)
Age 13 in 2007 × time 6.363*** 11.784***
(0.762) (1.344)
Age 14 in 2007 × time 6.458*** 12.054***
(0.728) (1.347)
Female child × time −0.207** −0.306**
(0.088) (0.135)
Household size −0.023 −0.050
(0.042) (0.083)
Number of males in the age group 16–60 0.006 0.114
(0.097) (0.127)
Average age of household members 0.017 0.029
(0.012) (0.019)
Land owned (acres) by household in 2007 × time 0.015 0.043*
(0.013) (0.022)
Household’s asset (index) in 2007 × time 0.060** 0.149**
(0.028) (0.065)
Mandal level total night lights in 2006 × time 0.0001 −0.0005*
(0.0002) (0.0002)
NREGS phase 1 district × time −0.936*** 0.803**
(0.126) (0.336)
Baseline enrolment rate in the district × time −7.822*** −14.074***
(0.766) (1.532)
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been significant changes in local political will for implementation of public programs
during 2007–2010.
Finally, our third instrument is the interaction of lagged rainfall shock with lagged
NREGS funds. This allows for the effect of rainfall shock on household income and
mothers’ labor force participation to vary with NREGS funds. For instance, the effect
on household income of a drought may be lower if there are more NREGS funds allo-
cated to provide local employment in a mandal.
3 Results
3.1 Impact of mother’s work status on child’s education
Table 2 shows the results for children’s time spent in school. The coefficient on
“mother is working” is positive and significant in column (1). If the mother works, her
child’s time spent in school goes up by 0.293 h in a day. To account for the possible
endogeneity of labor force participation of mothers and household income, we conduct
the 2SLS analysis. But before discussing the second stage, we show the first stage re-
sults in Table 3. For the endogenous variable “mother is working,” the coefficient on
lagged rainfall shock is significantly negative in column (1). This result lines up with
the existing literature which suggests that in India, women are more likely to work dur-
ing periods of economic distress such as droughts. While the coefficient on lagged
funds is insignificant, the interaction term is positive and significant in column (1), im-
plying that the effect of NREGS on mother’s workforce participation depends on the
level of lagged rainfall shock. To elaborate, at the mean lagged rainfall shock, the total
effect of NREGS funds on mother’s labor force participation is significantly positive.
The coefficient on lagged rainfall shock is positive and significant for annual household
income in column (2). An increase in the lagged funds sanctioned for NREGS projects
in a mandal increases the household income significantly. In times of good rainfall,
however, the sanctioned funds have a lower marginal effect on the total income (as in-
dicated by the negative coefficient of the interaction term). Our instruments are good
predictors of the endogenous variables as indicated by the F statistics reported in the
last row in Table 3.
Moving back to the second stage results in column (2) of Table 2, we find that the
coefficient on the dummy for mother working continues to be positive, significant, and
has a higher coefficient than in the ordinary least squares fixed effect (OLS-FE) specifi-
cation. When a mother works, it leads to her children attending school 6.506 h a day
Table 2 Effect of mother’s work status on child’s time spent in school (Continued)
Child fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 6550 6550
Number of children 3275 3275
R-squared 0.256
Weak identification stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 7.750
Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values 6.40 (20 %)
Over-identification stat (Hansen J) 1.701
Over-identification p value 0.192
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the child level in parentheses. Significant at *10, **5, and ***1 %
Afridi et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:7 Page 11 of 27
Table 3 First stage regressions (for 2SLS-FE regression in Table 2, column (2))
Variable Mother is
working
Annual household income in
thousands (Rs.)
(1) (2)
Lagged rainfall shock −0.207*** 7.607**
(0.021) (3.069)
Lagged amount of sanctioned NREGS funds in crores (Rs.) 0.001 0.470*
(0.001) (0.240)
Lagged rainfall shock × lagged amount of sanctioned NREGS
funds in crores (Rs.)
0.005*** −0.593***
(0.001) (0.095)
Age 5 in 2007 × time −2.032*** 29.050
(0.171) (26.647)
Age 6 in 2007 × time −2.026*** 29.953
(0.173) (28.678)
Age 7 in 2007 × time −2.011*** 30.703
(0.172) (26.904)
Age 8 in 2007 × time −2.034*** 22.197
(0.172) (26.122)
Age 9 in 2007 × time −2.020*** 27.439
(0.171) (26.265)
Age 10 in 2007 × time −2.045*** 27.600
(0.171) (26.407)
Age 11 in 2007 × time −2.007*** 23.858
(0.172) (26.676)
Age 12 in 2007 × time −2.071*** 25.730
(0.170) (26.437)
Age 13 in 2007 × time −2.051*** 35.460
(0.176) (28.385)
Age 14 in 2007 × time −2.065*** 25.810
(0.171) (27.004)
Female child × time 0.011 1.936
(0.015) (1.822)
Household size −0.005 4.903***
(0.007) (1.499)
Number of males in the age group 16–60 −0.018 1.104
(0.014) (2.697)
Average age of household members −0.001 −0.327
(0.002) (0.305)
Land owned (acres) by household in 2007 × time −0.007** 0.445
(0.003) (0.554)
Household’s asset (index) in 2007 × time −0.016*** 3.713***
(0.006) (1.047)
Mandal level total night lights in 2006 × time 0.000*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.003)
NREGS phase 1 district × time −0.223*** 9.933***
(0.028) (3.695)
Afridi et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:7 Page 12 of 27
more. This effect is over and above the income effect from working, the point estimate
of which is positive but not significant.
The coefficient of the 2SLS estimator measures the local average treatment effect
(LATE)—the impact on time spent in school among children whose mothers changed
their labor force participation status—in contrast to the OLS estimator which measures
the impact of mothers’ labor force participation for the full sample.23 The increase in
the magnitude of the 2SLS coefficient, as compared to the OLS, typically suggests that
the impact of the treatment on those who changed their behavior (referred to as com-
pliers) is much larger than on the rest of the population (Angrist and Pischke (2009),
Chapter 4.4–4.5). 24 Further, the instruments pass the over-identification test and the
weak identification critical value cut-offs.25
The significant coefficient on the age dummies, interacted with time, declines at
higher age groups. Thus, the older the child, the smaller is the point estimate on the in-
crease in time spent in school. This reflects the higher opportunity cost of time in
school for older children. The negative coefficient on the initial district level average
enrolment rate in both the OLS-FE and 2SLS-FE specifications, together with the posi-
tive coefficient on age dummies interacted with time, suggests that in districts where
school participation was high prior to 2007, there was a smaller increase in time spent
in school between 2007 and 2009–2010.26
The large increase in the number of hours spent in school suggests that mothers’
work may play an important role in the school enrolment decisions of children. We,
therefore, estimate the same specification used for time spent in school but with the
dependent variable “enrolment status.” The results are shown in Table 4. While the im-
pact of a mother working on her child’s school enrolment status is insignificant in OLS,
it is positive and significant in the 2SLS estimate—probability of a child being enrolled
in school rises by 47.2 percentage points. There are two factors that may drive this re-
sult. First, those children who are 5 years old and not enrolled in school at the baseline
may enrol in a primary school as they get older if their mothers work. Second, typically
children in older cohort at the baseline tend to drop out of school over time. Mothers
entering the workforce may result in lower drop outs. This 47.2 percentage point
increase in the probability of enrolment can potentially account for almost half of the
increase in the time spent in school.27
The impact of current household income is positive and significant (0.003) when the
dependent variable is enrolment status of the child. This suggests that any income
effect of changes in labor force participation status of a mother (or parents and other
household members) predominantly influences enrolment decisions. This contrasts
Table 3 First stage regressions (for 2SLS-FE regression in Table 2, column (2)) (Continued)
Baseline enrolment rate in the district × time 1.945*** −6.986
(0.164) (25.301)
Child fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 6550 6550
Number of children 3275 3275
R-squared 0.297 0.128
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F stat of excluded instruments 33.75 14.27
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the child level in parentheses. Significant at *10, **5, and ***1 %
Afridi et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:7 Page 13 of 27




Mother is working −0.009 0.472***
(0.017) (0.138)
Annual household income in thousands (Rs.) 0.0002 0.003**
(0.0001) (0.002)
Age 5 in 2007 × time 0.539*** 0.898***
(0.116) (0.177)
Age 6 in 2007 × time 0.308*** 0.661***
(0.119) (0.183)
Age 7 in 2007 × time 0.168 0.512***
(0.116) (0.177)
Age 8 in 2007 × time 0.136 0.522***
(0.117) (0.183)
Age 9 in 2007 × time 0.102 0.457***
(0.115) (0.174)
Age 10 in 2007 × time 0.096 0.467***
(0.114) (0.178)
Age 11 in 2007 × time 0.063 0.431**
(0.116) (0.178)
Age 12 in 2007 × time 0.046 0.433**
(0.113) (0.179)
Age 13 in 2007 × time −0.036 0.312*
(0.123) (0.184)
Age 14 in 2007 × time −0.004 0.382**
(0.118) (0.185)
Female child × time −0.010 −0.023
(0.014) (0.018)
Household size −0.017** −0.031**
(0.008) (0.012)
Number of males in the age group 16–60 0.0001 0.006
(0.015) (0.019)
Average age of household members 0.004** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.003)
Land owned (acres) by household in 2007 × time −0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.004)
Household’s asset (index) in 2007 × time 0.013*** 0.011
(0.005) (0.008)
Mandal level total night lights in 2006 × time 0.00004* 0.00001
(0.00002) (0.00003)
NREGS phase 1 district × time −0.033* 0.074*
(0.019) (0.042)
Baseline enrolment rate in the district × time −0.230* −0.720***
(0.126) (0.208)
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with the insignificance of household income on the child’s time spent in school
(Table 2), an outcome that measures both the extensive (enrolment) and the intensive
margins (more regular attendance) of children’s school participation.
While we find that the time spent in school has risen due to mother’s participation in
the workforce, a pertinent question to ask is whether there was a concomitant improve-
ment in the educational attainment of a child. Therefore, we conduct our analysis for
grade attainment by a child with the dependent variable “actual grade attainment of a
child divided by the grade the child should have completed at her/his age” with the
same specification. The sample for this outcome, therefore, consists of children aged
6–14 years. We find a significant effect of mother’s work participation on her child’s
grade progression—as reported in Table 5—the gap between a child’s actual and ideal
grade declines by 40.6 percentage points. 28 We do not find any heterogeneity in the
average impact for any of our measures of educational attainment.29 To elaborate, the
impact of mother’s work is significant and of comparable magnitude across both gen-
ders and age groups (younger children or 5- to 10-year-olds and older children or 11-
to 14-year-olds in 2007). The significant impact on the older age group of children, in
particular, cannot be explained away by the argument that the mothers use schools as
day care centers while they work.
3.2 Robustness checks
In this section, we report further robustness tests of our results for time spent in school
by accounting for alternative confounding mechanisms in Table 6.30
While the Right to Education Act, which aims to increase school participation rates
of disadvantaged children, was implemented in Andhra Pradesh (and nationwide) after
our study period in April 2010, it may have been preceded by construction of additional
schools which may in turn be correlated with NREGS intensity at the mandal level.31
Using school administrative data from the District Information System for Education
(DISE) at the mandal level for the years 2006 and 2009, we include the number of
schools as a control variable to address this concern. We do not find any significant
change on the coefficient of “mother working” in column (2) of Table 6.32
In our analysis, so far, we have focused on the working status of the mother.
However, if mothers’ and fathers’ decisions to work are correlated and the NREGS
program affects fathers’ work status as well, then our analysis may be identifying the
Table 4 Effect of mother’s work status on child’s school enrolment (Continued)
Child fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 6550 6550
Number of children 3275 3275
R-squared 0.249
Weak identification stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 7.750
Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values 6.40 (20 %)
Over-identification stat (Hansen J) 1.439
Over-identification p value 0.230
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the child level in parentheses. Significant at *10, **5, and ***1 %
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impact of fathers’ work status. However, inclusion of this variable does not affect the
coefficient of the mothers’ workforce participation in column (3).
Past rainfall shocks as well as income earned from participation in the NREGS in pre-
vious periods may affect current schooling through an effect on current household
wealth. For example, households may have bought or sold assets in response to the
shocks and NREGS work opportunities in the previous periods. However, inclusion of
current wealth may be endogenous as decisions to accumulate assets may correlate
with schooling as well as labor supply decisions. Hence, we have included baseline
household wealth trends in our main specification. However, in order to see whether
our estimated coefficient is affected by lagged effects of shocks and program fund allo-
cation on household wealth, we include current household wealth as a regressor.
Results in column (4) suggest that the inclusion of this variable does not have any
significant impact on our estimated coefficient on mother’s work status. Similarly, past
NREGS work may affect migration in the household and that may impact schooling
outcomes directly. To see whether this is the case, we control directly for the number
of household members who were present in the previous YLS round but are absent in
the current round to approximate migration.33 Again, the inclusion of this variable does
not affect our results (column (5)).
It has been contended that NREGS may affect wages for private work in the local
labor market. If any increase in past wages influences current wages (Kaur 2014), it
may affect current school outcomes. The inclusion of current income in our main
specification accounts for this possibility. However, to show that our results are robust
to any remaining concerns on this count, we control for the highest current daily wage
for males and females in the local community (columns (6) and (7)).34 Again, the
coefficient on mother’s work remains unchanged.
Table 5 Effect of mother’s work status on child’s grade progression
Variable OLS-FE 2SLS-FE
(1) (2)
Mother is working 0.060*** 0.406***
(0.014) (0.101)
Annual household income in thousands (Rs.) 0.00001 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.001)
Other control variables Yes Yes
Child fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 4218 4218
Number of children 2109 2109
R-squared 0.046
Weak identification stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 7.387
Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values 6.40 (20 %)
Over-identification stat (Hansen J) 0.384
Over-identification p value 0.535
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the child level in parentheses. Significant at *10, **5, and ***1 %. Additional
control variables included are as follows: time interacted with age dummies, time interacted with gender, household size,
number of males in the age group 16–60, average age of household members, land owned by household in 2007 interacted
with time, household’s asset (index) in 2007 interacted with time, time trends depending on whether the district is a NREGS
phase 1 district, mandal level total night lights in 2006, and baseline enrolment rate in the district. The same set of instruments
(lagged rainfall shock, lagged amount fund sanctioned in NREGS, and their interaction) is used for annual household income and
mother’s working status
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The NREGS mandates the conduct of regular audits of program projects by local
stakeholders.35 Since one of the objectives of the audits is to make beneficiary house-
holds aware of their rights and entitlements, it is possible that a higher frequency of
these audits leads to a greater demand for access to better quality schools by parents as
well as a rise in women’s participation in the NREGS and in the workforce. Hence, any
observed relationship between mother’s labor market participation and children’s time
in school could be driven by a rise in households’ awareness levels. To control for this,
we allow the trend to depend on the number of social audits that have taken place in
Table 6 Robustness checks for the effect of mother’s work status on child’s time spent in school
(2SLS-FE)
Variable Time spent in school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mother is working 6.506*** 7.047*** 6.472*** 6.556*** 6.453*** 6.421*** 6.611*** 6.151*** 6.498***
(1.102) (1.299) (1.106) (1.104) (1.095) (1.074) (1.164) (1.018) (1.102)
Number of schools in
the mandal
Yes






















Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6550 6550 6550 6550 6550 6182 6182 6550 6550




























1.701 0.191 1.649 1.809 1.730 0.932 1.905 1.619 1.695
Over-identification
p value
0.192 0.662 0.199 0.179 0.188 0.334 0.168 0.203 0.193
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the child level in parentheses. Significant at *10, **5, and ***1 %. Additional
control variables included are as follows: household income, time interacted with age dummies, time interacted with
gender, household size, number of males in the age group 16–60, average age of household members, land owned by
household in 2007 interacted with time, household’s asset (index) in 2007 interacted with time, time trends depending
on whether the district is a NREGS phase 1 district, mandal level total night lights in 2006, and baseline enrolment rate in
the district. Instruments as mentioned in Table 5
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the mandal between the two survey rounds interacted with time in column (8). Our
results are unaffected.
Finally, to test for the possibility that schools substitute for day care for working
mothers, we control for the demographic composition of the household in column (9)
in Table 6. The effect of mothers working on children’s time in school should be insig-
nificant if there are older siblings or grandparents in the household to take care of the
younger ones. But the interpretation of our results is unchanged when we control for
the presence of older siblings and of household members in the 60+ age group.
4 Discussion of results
Our results establish that when a mother works, there is a significant, positive impact
on her children’s educational attainment. Since we have accounted for any income ef-
fects in our specification, can an improvement in mothers’ say in household decision-
making when she participates in the labor market explain our results? If so, we should
see a positive effect of mother’s labor force participation on other schooling indicators
that provide more direct evidence on investments in children. We, therefore, use
household level data on the share of total expenditure that is spent on education to test
our hypothesis further.36
Our specification is now run at the household level (since these data are not available
at the child level) with additional controls for the number of children in the 5–17 age
group (boys and girls separately), the square of the number of these children and the
average age and gender composition of this group in the household. Our main coeffi-
cient of interest is working status of the mother of the indexed child and his/her
siblings in the household.
We find no significant result for the overall sample. Stratifying the households by
baseline land ownership, we find significant results only for households with less than
median landownership. We report only these significant results in Table 7 (other results
are available on request). The analysis suggests that mothers’ participation in the labor
force increases the share of total expenditure that is spent on schooling expenses for
the less landed households. When mothers work, the share of expenditure towards
education rises by 3.8 percentage points. The rise in the share of expenditure is largely
accounted by fees, tuition, and school uniform (column (2)). This indicates that
mothers’ labor force participation is indeed leading to more investment in education in
less landed households.37
To explore the bargaining power mechanism further, we use data available in the second
round of the YLS to analyze whether participation in the labor market led to improvements
in mothers’ decision-making abilities within households.38 Our dependent variable is the
binary response to two questions, each, for three sources of household income:
1. “Is the caregiver responsible for making the key decisions about any of the plots
(land)/work for wages activities (wage activities)/business and self-employment ac-
tivities (business and self-employment)?”
2. “Does the caregiver control the use of the earnings from the sale of goods or rent
from any of these plots (earnings from land)/from any work for wages activities
(earnings from wage activities)/from any business and self-employment activities
(earnings from business and self-employment)?”
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The sample is restricted to caregivers who are mothers in age group 16–
60 years. Our main variable of interest is whether the mother works. Results for
the 2SLS specification are reported in Table 8. The positive and significant coeffi-
cient on “mother is working” across all outcomes suggests that greater participa-
tion of mothers in the labor market does increase the say and control these
women have on important decisions being made within the household. In rural
areas, earnings from land, wages, and business and self-employment activities are
likely to be the most important sources of income for households. This result,
therefore, bolsters our claim that an increase in work opportunities for women is
likely to have a positive effect on their decision-making abilities within the
household.39
5 Conclusion
We utilize the sub-district level temporal variation in the intensity of the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) and in rainfall shocks in Andhra
Pradesh (AP) to determine the effect of exogenous changes in the demand for
labor on women’s labor force participation and thereby their children’s educational
outcomes.
Using panel data from the Young Lives Study for 2007 and 2009–2010, we find that
participation of mothers in the workforce has a positive effect on the probability of her
children being enrolled in school and her children’s time in school. This carries impli-
cations for the latter’s educational attainment as well. Specifically, children whose
mothers work move closer to their ideal grade for age.
Table 7 Effect of mother’s work status on household’s budget share on education (2SLS-FE)
Variable Baseline land≤median
Budget share of total
education expenditure
Budget share of school fees,




Mother is working 0.038* 0.031* 0.007
(0.023) (0.018) (0.012)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1998 2000 2010
Number of households 999 1000 1005
Weak identification stat









Over-identification p value 0.699 0.586 0.921
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. Significant at *10, **5, and ***1 %. Additional
control variables are as follows: average age of children in the school-going age (5–17 years), number of boys in school-going age,
number of girls in school-going age, square of number of boys in school-going age, square of number of girls in school-going
age, household income, household size, number of males in the age group 16–60, average age of household members, land
owned by household in 2007 interacted with time, household’s asset (index) in 2007 interacted with time, time
trends depending on whether the district is a NREGS phase 1 district, mandal level total night lights in 2006, and
baseline enrolment rate in the district. Instruments are as mentioned in Table 5
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We find evidence that suggests that the positive impact of mothers’ participa-
tion in work could be due to her improved position in household decision-
making. Our assertion is supported by recent qualitative evidence on the empow-
ering effects of NREGS on rural women (Pankaj and Tankha 2010; Khera and
Nayak 2009).
Although our results are contextual and specific to AP—a state which has tradition-
ally exhibited high rates of women’s participation in work relative to the national aver-
age and has also been among the best implementers of the NREGS since its
inception—they provide strong evidence of the beneficial effects of increasing women’s
participation in the labor force. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the design of




2We are abstracting from any long-term effects of changes in fertility due to
increased labor force participation of women since we are looking at these changes over
a short period of 2 to 3 years.
3Data for 2002 (round 1 of YLS) are not comparable to the 2007 and 2009–2010
data (rounds 2 and 3 of YLS, respectively) because of differing methods of measur-
ing labor supply. Moreover, there are no data on income earned by the household
in 2002.
4We measure grade progression as the ratio of actual grade completed to the
ideal grade for age. Details in Section 3.













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother is working 0.840*** 1.046*** 0.908*** 1.404*** 0.733** 1.063**
(0.248) (0.262) (0.287) (0.384) (0.347) (0.424)








8.18 (15 %) 8.18 (15 %) 5.45 (25 %) 5.45 (25 %) 5.45 (25 %) 6.40 (20 %)
Over-identification
stat (Hansen J)
0.00957 0.304 1.220 0.731 0.0469 0.0605
Over-identification
p value
0.922 0.581 0.269 0.393 0.829 0.806
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Significant at *10, **5, and ***1 %. Other
control variables include the following: mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s highest grade passed, number of
sons and daughters in the age group of 0–5, 6–14, and 15 or above (separately), household size, number of males in the
age group 16–60, average age of household members, household income, land owned by household, household’s asset
index, religion, caste, whether the district is a NREGS phase 1 district, and mandal level total night lights in 2006.
Instruments as mentioned in Table 5
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5Anantapur, Cuddapah, Karimnagar, and Mahbubnagar implemented the NREGS in
2006. Srikakulam and West Godavari were the two districts that came under NREGS in
2007 and 2008, respectively.
6There was a rise in fathers’ participation rate in NREGS during this period as well.
Since overall labor force participation rate of fathers did not change, this suggests that
fathers may have taken up NREGS work as an additional activity.
7The time spent in school is recorded as hours spent in school on a typical day in the
previous week. The total time spent on education on a typical day consists of time
spent in school and time spent on studying outside school (private tuition and at
home). The average time spent on education outside the school in the sample is less
than 20 % of the total time spent on education on a typical day. While we focus on
time spent in school (TSS) as the dependent variable here, the same specification is
adopted for other child education outcomes.
8Whether the income effect is significant or not is a function of the cost of schooling
as well. If physical access to schooling is relatively easy and costs of schooling are subsi-
dized (as is the case for public primary schools), any effect of an increase in household
income may be muted for the age group under study here.
9Note that we do not include the child’s age as a control variable because the change
in age over our study period is the same for all children. Further, we do not include the
secular time trend as it is a linear combination of the age cohort trends which are
included in the specification.
10Asset index was constructed using principal component analysis of binary variables
indicating ownership of durable consumer goods by the household, viz., television,
radio, car, motorbike, bicycle, telephone, mobile phone, refrigerator, fan, electric oven,
table and chair, sofa, and bedstead.
11Data on night lights is from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) website: http://www.noaa.gov.
12Note that we do not use the phasing of the NREGS to identify the effect of mother’s
labor force participation on her children’s schooling. The inclusion of the program
phase trend as a control in our empirical specification invalidates district level phasing
as the source of variation for identification.
13We source this information from the question on the “status of current attend-
ance (enrolment) in educational institutions” in the 2004–2005 employment and
unemployment round of the National Sample Survey. One of the factors that could
affect temporal changes in participation in schooling is a change in the quality of
schools, specifically a shift from public to private schools. The YLS contains infor-
mation on the type of school the child is enrolled in for only a subset of our
sample. Community level data on the type of schools are not comparable between
the two survey rounds. Our results are, however, robust to the inclusion of a
dummy variable for whether a private school at any level existed in the locality in
2007 or 2009–2010.
14The child fixed effects specification also accounts for any unobservables at the geo-
graphic (district, mandal, and village) level that may be correlated with regressors on
the right-hand side and that may also affect children’s time spent in school.
15The variable capturing rainfall shocks is constructed from the precipitation data
available from the Center for Climatic Research at the University of Delaware. The
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data include monthly precipitation values at 0.5° intervals in latitude and longitude.
To match this data at the mandal level, the nearest latitude-longitude to each man-
dal headquarter is taken. To construct the rainfall shock at the mandal level, we
calculate the long-term (1990–1991 to 2008–2009) average mandal level rainfall in
the months of an agriculture year. Standard deviation of rainfall for the same
period is also calculated at the mandal level. Then rainfall shock is defined as the
deviation of actual rainfall in the reference period from the long-term average, di-
vided by the standard deviation.
16The YLS has been collecting more detailed information on these children since
the first round of the study in 2002. Data from the 2002 survey round is, however,
not comparable to the later rounds used in our study as discussed in footnote 3
above.
17Data on the sanctioned funds at the mandal level were obtained from the Department
of Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh.
18Although the NREGS envisages a demand-driven program, the reality is quite dif-
ferent according to several recent studies. Research on Andhra Pradesh (Afridi et al.
2013) indicates that the program is supply- rather than demand-driven.
19Our second stage results are similar when we use sanctioned NREGS funds in
2005–2006 as an instrument for the 2007 round of the YLS. However, since the NREGS
did not exist in 2005–2006, the instrument takes the value 0 for all mandals, which
makes our first stage weak. We, therefore, use sanctioned program funds in 2006–2007
instead. Since NREGS has just been initiated in 2006, the assumption that the sanc-
tioned funds were not demand-driven is reasonable.
20Note that an overwhelming proportion of NREGS funds have been utilized for
irrigation and water conservation projects since the program’s inception in AP: soil
and water conservation, drought proofing and afforestation, micro- and minor irri-
gation works, rehabilitation of tanks and traditional water bodies, land leveling,
and bush and jungle clearance. It is unlikely, therefore, that the program could dir-
ectly affect access to schools or children’s allocation of time to household chores,
viz., fetching drinking water: http://nrega.ap.gov.in/Nregs/FrontServlet?requestType=
Common_Ajax_engRH&actionVal=Display&page=WorkCatog_eng.
21To test this claim, we first regress the change in the mandal level sanctioned
NREGS funds (between 2006–2007 and 2007–2008) on the district’s NREGS phase
and the mandal’s total night lights in 2006. We then regress the residual of this
regression on various observable characteristics of the mandal that may determine
NREGS fund allocation (viz., total number of households, the number of people
belonging to disadvantaged communities such as scheduled castes and tribes). We
do not find a significant effect of any of these variables on NREGS fund alloca-
tion. Moreover, the point estimates do not suggest any systematic determinant of
NREGS fund allocation. See Table 9 in Appendix for details.
22Enrolment of children in the 6–10 years age group was almost 93 % in both 2007
and 2009–2010, while enrolment in the 11–14 age group was almost 81 % in 2007 and
86 % in 2009–2010 in our sample.
23In particular, of the 1019 mothers who did not work in 2007, almost 72 % entered
the labor force in 2009–2010. Of these mothers, more than 66 % worked on NREGS
projects in 2009–2010.
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24We recognize that any additional time spent in school could be substituted by
less time spent studying outside school leading to an insignificant effect of
mother’s work on total time spent on education on a typical day. In an alternate
specification, therefore, we consider the total time spent on education (including
time spent studying outside the school) as the dependent variable. Our results are
unchanged.
25Critical values for the Stock and Yogo (2003) weak instrument test (5 % signifi-
cance) reported in the table, based on 2SLS size with 2 endogenous variables and
3 instruments, are 13.43, 8.18, 6.40 and 5.45 for the 10, 15, 20, and 25 % sizes,
respectively.
26Lagged rainfall shock may force children to drop out of school in the year
previous to our reference period. To check that our results are robust to this pos-
sibility, we include a dummy for whether a child is enrolled in school as an en-
dogenous regressor in our main specification (2SLS-FE). Our results do not
change.
27In our sample, the average hours spent in school by children who are enrolled in
school is approximately 7.15 h. The 47.2 percentage point increase in enrolment rates,
hence, accounts for an average increase of 3.37 h in school—almost half (or 47.13 %) of
the increase in time spent in school.
28This result also indicates that the effect of mothers working on schooling is not
driven purely by the enrolment of those who were 5 years old in 2007.
29There are certain caveats to interpreting the effect of mothers’ working status
on children’s grade progression. First, the highest grade completed is right cen-
sored for the sub-sample of children who are still enrolled in school. This is not
the case, however, for children who have completed schooling (17-year-olds in
2009–2010) or have dropped out by the time of the survey interview. Second, the
effect of parental labor market activities may not be reflected completely in grade
attainment for those households which are interviewed before April (March is the
last month of an academic year) since the highest grade attained by children in
these households would be right censored. Finally, the highest grade completed is
a stock variable that may be determined not just by current labor force participa-
tion of mothers but also their participation between 2007 and 2009–2010.
30We report similar robustness checks for the enrolment outcome in Table 10 in the
Appendix.
31The reference period for the 2009–2010 round of the YLS was August 2009–March
2010.
32Our results also hold up if we include the total number of private and public
schools separately.
33For this calculation, we also use the data from the 2002 round of YLS. We
exclude household members who died and women who left the household due to
marriage between 2007 and 2009–2010.
34We obtained this information from the community level questionnaire in the
YLS.
35A novel feature of the NREGS is the introduction of compulsory “social”
audits of projects carried out under the program by beneficiary households (and
therefore referred to as “social”) at regular intervals. The AP government has
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institutionalized the conduct of these audits in the state since the inception of
the NREGS in 2006.
36An alternative mechanism that could explain our results is the mandatory
provision of child care facilities at NREGS work sites. Mothers who participated
in NREGS work may have had better access to child care facilities. This would
free up the time of school-going age siblings, particularly girls, who could then
attend school more regularly. The 2007 YLS survey respondents were asked
whether the NREGS participant had “benefited from child care facilities at the
worksite.” In the 2009–2010 survey, the respondents were asked: “Were there
child care facilities in the last (NREGS) worksite?” Only 1 % of households report
using on-site child care facilities in 2007 while more than 80 % of households
report absence of child care facilities at the last worksite in 2009–2010. We,
therefore, do not consider this as a valid explanation of our findings.
37Our results are unchanged if we use total expenditure on schooling as the
dependent variable.
38These data were not collected by the YLS in 2009–2010. Our analysis, therefore, is
cross-sectional.
39Alternative definitions of mother’s workforce participation—share of mother’s
NREGS income in total household income and total number of days mother
worked in the reference period—lead us to similar conclusions. See Table 11 in
Appendix for details.
Appendix: online supplementary material
Table 9 Determinants of change in the amount of allocated NREGS funds
Variable Residual change in allocated funds between
2006–2007 and 2007–2008 in a mandal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of rural households 0.000793
(0.000594)
Scheduled caste population −0.000585
(0.000666)




Number of agricultural laborers 0.000508
(0.000733)




Constant −7.637 4.179 −6.265 −2.967 −3.39
(6.706) (6.313) (6.052) (6.000) (4.95)
Observations 15 15 15 15 15
R-squared 0.121 0.250 0.108 0.036 0.039
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10, **5, and ***1 %
aSource: http://www.apsec.gov.in/ELECTIONRESULTS/MPTC%20ELECTED%20RESULTS%202006/mptcs_Electedindex2006.htm
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Table 10 Robustness checks for the effect of mother’s work status on child’s school enrolment (2SLS-FE)
Variable Enrolment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mother is working 0.642*** 0.399*** 0.471*** 0.452*** 0.455*** 0.437*** 0.494*** 0.472*** 0.471***
(0.166) (0.146) (0.139) (0.135) (0.137) (0.136) (0.151) (0.130) (0.138)
Number of schools in the mandal Yes
Father is working Yes
Asset quartiles Yes
Number of household members who migrated Yes
Maximum daily male wage rate in the community Yes
Maximum daily female wage rate in the community Yes
Number of NREGS social audits in mandal × time Yes
Number of household members aged above 60 years Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6550 6550 6550 6550 6550 6182 6182 6550 6550
Number of children 3275 3275 3275 3275 3275 3091 3091 3275 3275
Weak identification stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 7.750 4.361 7.733 7.913 7.758 6.736 6.501 7.025 7.778
Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values 6.40 (20 %) 5.45 (25 %) 6.40 (20 %) 6.40 (20 %) 6.40 (20 %) 6.40 (20 %) 6.40 (20 %) 6.40 (20 %) 6.40 (20 %)
Over-identification stat (Hansen J) 1.749 2.624 1.452 1.660 1.423 2.318 1.301 1.441 1.448
Over-identification p value 0.186 0.105 0.228 0.198 0.233 0.128 0.254 0.230 0.229
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the child level in parentheses. Significant at *10, **5, and ***1 %. Additional control variables included are as follows: household income, time interacted with age dummies,
time interacted with gender, household size, number of males in the age group 16–60, average age of household members, land owned by household in 2007 interacted with time, household’s asset (index) in 2007
interacted with time, time trends depending on whether the district is a NREGS phase 1 district, mandal level total night lights in 2006, and baseline enrolment rate in the district. The same set of instruments (lagged
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